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The Real Reason the Investor Class Hates Pensions
By David Webber
March 5, 2018

No issue in America today better illustrates the divergent interests of working Americans and the 1 percent
than pension reform. Substantial empirical evidence shows that America’s favored retirement vehicle — the
401(k), recently renounced by its own inventors — is grossly inadequate and will leave tens of millions of
Americans with insufficient retirement assets. And yet states and cities are busy converting traditional
pensions into these failing 401(k)s or equivalents, to the great benefit of money managers and the finance
class.
Advocates of pension “reform” — which really means cutting or eliminating traditional pension funds — will
tell you that such funds are a big drain on state and local budgets, since, as defined-benefit programs, they
are obligated to pay workers a defined amount in their retirement. But that’s largely a question of political
priorities; underfunded pensions are the result of, well, decades of underfunding pensions. The real reason
for the attack on pensions goes deeper, and exposes the great and growing rift between America’s economic
elite and everyone else.
Consider how we 401(k) holders behave as investors. How many of us thought to sue Wells Fargo after the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau revealed that the bank had created millions of fake credit card and
bank accounts? Or to push our fund managers to do so for us? How many of us call up our fund managers
after a quarter, a year or a decade in which we underperformed the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index to
renegotiate our fees? Or even to switch managers? How many of us even know how our funds performed
relative to the S.&P. 500?
The answer to all of these questions is a number very close to zero. We 401(k) holders are the world’s ideal
source of capital. We let ourselves be charged high fees that we do not understand, we accept poor returns
quarter after quarter, we never sue to enforce our rights, we never vote as shareholders and we never tell
our investment managers how we think they ought to vote. We are beyond passive; we are supine.
At bottom, the problem is structural. We are to our investees and investment managers what nonunionized,
“right to work” workers are to their employers: alone and devoid of leverage to negotiate. That stands in
sharp contrast to traditional pensions, which, like unions, are collective and centrally managed.
For example, the nation’s largest traditional pension, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System,
known as Calpers, has 1.9 million members and over $300 billion in assets. When it calls up an investment
manager to complain about performance, or to dump that manager, or when it calls a lawyer to sue for fraud,
that catches the attention of corporate managers, of hedge funds, of private equity funds. That’s why they
succeed where we fail. All of us benefit from their successes, which raise the value of companies we own.
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Our mutual funds could do the same for us, if they wanted to, but they don’t. Despite important recent
gestures towards activism, they have trailed far behind pension fund activists, and will continue to do so.
They don’t want to challenge the compensation, reelection or legal judgment of the same corporate
managers from whom they hope to win the right to manage our 401(k) money in the first place. Not true for
public pension funds.
In just the past few years, pension funds (private pension funds have been almost completely eliminated)
have radically reformed the role of shareholder opinion in executive compensation, successfully lobbying for
the inclusion of “say-on-pay” votes in the Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation and for mandatory
disclosure of the chief executive/worker pay ratio. Pensions have also played the most prominent role in
vivifying corporate voting, long an oxymoron. Because of a campaign run by New York City’s pension funds
and others, hundreds of companies now offer significant, long-term shareholders a meaningful opportunity
to put their own board candidates on a corporate ballot.
Pension funds have similarly backed the shift from plurality- to majority-voting rules, and they have pushed
to destagger corporate boards so that the entire board is up for election every election cycle, rather than just
one-third per cycle, a move that increases a board’s accountability. Traditional pension funds have also
brought almost all of the most successful shareholder lawsuits, from the suits against Enron and Worldcom
to the one against Wells Fargo.
Nevertheless, almost everywhere we look, these pensions are under attack. Entities like the Koch brothers’
Americans for Prosperity, the Laura and John Arnold Foundation (John Arnold made a fortune at Enron),
the American Legislative Exchange Council and their allies are engaged in a multifaceted, multistate
campaign to gut traditional pensions like Calpers.
This relentless, well-funded attack has taken every form of political advocacy available. It ranges from
campaign contributions to ballot initiatives to model legislation to lobbying to lawsuits to financing academic
and judicial conferences. One estimate suggests that Mr. Arnold’s foundation alone has spent $50 million on
this issue, an estimate Mr. Arnold vigorously disputes. The primary goal of the attack is to convert these
traditional pensions into 401(k)s.
The justification is that these pensions are in crisis. The familiar claim is that states and municipalities face
unsustainable pension obligations that will crowd out other government spending and lead to higher taxes.
Therefore, traditional pensions, which guarantee retirement payments to workers — leaving states and
cities on the hook — must be replaced by 401(k)s, which offer no such guarantee.
Though the mainstream media has mostly taken the crisis claim at face value, economists and actuaries
debate its extent and even its existence. Since the Great Recession, 49 states have reformed pensions to
make them more sustainable, increasing employee contributions and reducing benefits. Wherever one
stands on the underfunding question, plenty of options short of converting pensions to 401(k)s exist,
including ones that would preserve some collective shareholder voice. But these are rarely considered.
Why?
We cannot understand the drive toward pension “reform” by looking only at the liability side of the balance
sheet: how much we owe workers and what it will cost to pay them. We must look at the asset side, too: how
these pensions invest their money, and their ability to exercise shareholder voice that the rest of us lack.
If the Kochs and their allies succeed in smashing and scattering these last remaining pension funds into
millions of 401(k)s, they will do more than just undermine the retirement security of millions of Americans.
They will silence their economic voice. The pension reform drive should be understood, at least in part, as a
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campaign of economic voter suppression. And it is coming, soon, to a jurisdiction near you, if it isn’t there
already.
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